The Eastern Front In World War 3. Volume 1 - ebook

Dedicated to

Frederick Francis Petersen

(1923–1979)

Having already been exposed to asbestos by his employer prior to enlisting in the United States Navy on 9 December 1942 at the age of nineteen, Frederick participated in combat actions in North Africa, Sicily (July 1943), Salerno (September 1943)—where he received two citations for bravery—and in Normandy (June 1944), where he participated in the assault on Omaha Beach. After surviving four amphibious landings in the European Theater, the Navy decided they could use his expertise in the Pacific Theater. Amphibious landings at Leyte in the Philippines (October 1944), Iwo Jima (February–March 1945), and Okinawa (April–June 1945) brought Frederick’s total to seven. Having fought German, Italian, and Japanese fascism without receiving so much as a scratch, Frederick returned to the home he defended only to prematurely die an extremely painful Asbestosis death and leave his widow to compel the industrial perpetrators through the courts to assume responsibility.Contributors:

Jerzy Aleksandrowicz

E&Y Poland

COL (Ret.) Mirosław Banasik

Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce, Poland

Dr. Jānis Bērzinš

Latvian Defence College

BG (Ret.) Hans Damen

INSPARCOM Strategy and Logistics

Dr. Michael D. Evans

Concept Materials, Inc.

LTG (Ret.) Frederick Benjamin Hodges

former Commander of United States Army Europe

Charles Preston Long

Centre for the Study of New Generation Warfare

Gregory King Melcher

Chief of Operations, Centre for the Study of New Generation Warfare

Dr. Łukasz Przybyło

War Studies Academy, Poland

Introductions:

Dr. Łukasz Przybyło

War Studies Academy, Poland

Dr. Silvu Nate

Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, RomaniaWSTĘP
- ŁUKASZ PRZYBYŁO

Po przeczytaniu książki Phillipa A. Petersena przypomniał mi się długi telegram Kennana z Moskwy, w którym amerykański dyplomata pisał do prezydenta Trumana:

obawiali się, co by się stało, gdyby Rosjanie dowiedzieli się prawdy o świecie poza granicami, a cudzoziemcy prawdy o świecie Rosjan. Rosyjscy przywódcy nauczyli się więc szukać poczucia bezpieczeństwa tylko w cierpliwej, ale śmiertelnej walce o całkowite zniszczenie konkurencyjnej potęgi, ale nigdy w zawieranych z nią umowach i kompromisach1.

Nie ma znaczenia czy w Rosji panuje car, Politbiuro, czy Putin – cele imperium się nie zmieniają, choć otoczka ideologiczna tak. Polacy, a także byli mieszkańcy demoludów i republik sowieckich w Europie Środkowej i Wschodniej, są specjalnie wyczuleni na rosyjską politykę zmierzającą do ponownego uzależnienia i zniewolenia naszych krajów postrzeganych jako „strefa bezpieczeństwa”, a nie suwerenne państwa. Przez dekady, nieufne podejście do Rosji, uważane było za fobię nie znajdującą uzasadnienia w faktach. Podejście takie miała nie tylko Europa Zachodnia ale i USA ogłaszające kolejne resety i szukające jakiegoś _modus vivendi_ z Rosjanami.

Dopiero agresja na Ukrainę w latach 2014–2015 otworzyła (choć cały czas nie w pełni) oczy Zachodowi. Morderstwa dysydentów, wojna informacyjna z Zachodem (Brexit, Katalonia, wybory w USA, itd.), wspieranie wszelkich ruchów mających niszczyć nasze społeczeństwa od środka, zbrodnie wojenne i terror na Krymie oraz w zajętej części Ukrainy – wszystko to wzbudza tylko ograniczoną reakcję USA, NATO i UE. A przecież:

nie postępuje według ustalonych planów. Nie ryzykuje, jeśli nie jest to konieczne. Jest odporna na logikę rozumu, ale bardzo wrażliwa na logikę siły. Z tego powodu może z łatwością się cofnąć – i tak zazwyczaj robi, jeśli napotka silny opór. Zatem jeśli przeciwnik ma wystarczającą siłę i jasno pokazuje gotowość jej użycia, rzadko musi się do niej uciec2.

Nadzieja Zachodu na ułożenie się z Rosją, wciągnięcie ją w demokratyczne, międzynarodowe struktury, ucywilizowanie, spełzły na niczym. Rosjanom udało się natomiast skorumpowanie elit europejskich, czego najlepszym przykładem są Gerhard Schröder, Marie Le Pen, François Fillon3, czy szefowa austriackiego MSZ Karin Kneissl na której ślub jako gość przybył Putin razem z chórem Kozaków4. Czym innym niż korupcją i głupotą tłumaczyć można traktowanie Rosji, której obroty handlowe z Niemcami w pierwszych trzech kwartałach 2021 r. są trzy razy mniejsze od Polski, jako poważnego partnera ekonomicznego5? Chyba że elity europejskie liczą na stworzenie z Rosji kolonii surowcowej? To by była jednak skrajna naiwność. „Stacja benzynowa posiadająca broń atomową” nigdy na to nie pójdzie.

Kilka dekad „znieczulania” przyniosło swoje efekty, dopiero od niedawna Federacja Rosyjska znów postrzegana jest w swojej prawdziwej postaci – brutalnego imperium, kierującego się swoją odmianą racjonalności niekompatybilną z liberalną demokracją. Wieloletnie inwestycje w siły zbrojne i narzędzia wojny informacyjnej uczyniły z Rosji, po raz kolejny na przestrzeni wieków, groźnego przeciwnika. Wydaje się, że jest to jednak ostatni przybór fali, ponieważ taki poziom zbrojeń jest nie do utrzymania w perspektywie zmiany paradygmatu energetycznego, który w perspektywie dekady lub dwóch całkowicie zmieni świat. Na pewno zaś zmieni Rosję z jej uzależnieniem od eksportu ropy i gazu. Oczywiście kraj ten może się zmienić i przyjąć te wartości, które dzisiaj hołubi tylko mała część społeczeństwa rosyjskiego – oznaczałoby to jednak krach kleptokracji rządzącej dziś Federacją Rosyjską. Nie byłby to proces bezbolesny – czego obawiają się wszyscy sąsiedzi Rosji. Wydaje się jednak, że trzeba oddzielić rosyjską oligarchię od społeczeństwa, bo:

w większości są przyjaźnie nastawieni do świata zewnętrznego, który chętnie by poznali, są też chętni sprawdzić w tym świecie swoje talenty, ale przede wszystkim chcą żyć w pokoju i cieszyć się z owoców własnej pracy6.

Wydaje się że w tym trudnym momencie dziejowym, kiedy „czasy znów stały się ciekawe” najważniejsze dla Polski i państw naszego regionu przetrwanie rosyjskiego wzmożenia imperialnego poprzez budowanie odstraszania militarnego i zacieśniania więzów gospodarczo-politycznych z Zachodem. Ze względu na swój potencjał ekonomiczny i militarny Stany Zjednoczone są i będą liderem wolnego świata – naszym kluczowym sojusznikiem.

Nowa Generacja Wojny, której genezę i główne założenia przedstawiono w niniejszym opracowaniu, jest dla świata euroatlantyckiego niezwykle groźna, bo żeruje na słabościach społeczeństwa demokratycznego zwielokrotnionych przez rewolucję informacyjną i internet. Wydaje się jednak, że demokracja, która przeszła już kilka prób dziejowych, może i powinna stanąć do walki o swoje wartości. Jednak w pierwszej kolejności trzeba zrozumieć strategię przeciwnika, a potem pokonać ją własną. Dlatego książka Phillipa A. Petersena jasno pokazująca mechanizmy jakich używa Putin i Federacja Rosyjska do walki z Zachodem, jest tak ważna. Uświadomienie sobie zagrożenia i jego kształtu może umożliwić politykom, społeczeństwom i narodom podejmowanie właściwych decyzji i obronę przed rosyjską agresją na nasze wartości, wolność i przyszłość naszych dzieci.

_Łukasz Przybyło, Ph.D._INTRODUCTION
- ŁUKASZ PRZYBYŁO

After reading Phillip A. Petersen’s book, I was reminded of Kennan’s famous long telegram from Moscow in which the American diplomat wrote to President Truman:

have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct conduct between western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about the world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

It does not matter whether Russia is ruled by a tsar, Politburo, or Putin—the goals of the empire do not change, although the ideological envelope does. Poles, as well as former residents of communist countries and Soviet republics in Central and Eastern Europe, are especially sensitive to the Russian policy aimed at making us again dependent and enslaved, with our states perceived as a “security zone”—not sovereign entities. For decades, a distrustful attitude towards Russia has been considered an unjustified phobia. Such an approach was taken not only by Western Europe but also by the USA announcing further resets and looking for some _modus vivendi_ with the Russians.

Only the aggression against Ukraine in 2014–2015 opened the eyes of the West (though not fully). The murders of dissidents, information warfare with the West (Brexit, Catalonia, US elections, etc.), supporting all movements aimed at destroying our societies from the inside, war crimes and terror in Crimea as well as in the occupied part of Ukraine—all this arouses only a limited response from the US, NATO, and the EU. But:

does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw—and usually does—when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so.

The hope of the West to come to terms with Russia, to involve it in democratic, international structures, to civilize it, has failed. The Russians, on the other hand, managed to corrupt the European elite, the best examples of which are Gerhard Schröder, Marie Le Pen, François Fillon, or the head of the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Karin Kneissl, at whose wedding Putin came as a guest with a choir of Cossacks. What other than corruption and stupidity can explain the treatment of Russia as a serious economic partner? Its trade turnover with Germany in the first three quarters of 2021 was three times smaller than Poland’s. Unless the European elite is dreaming of creation a resource colony from Russia? However, that would be an extreme naivety. Russia—“a gas station with nuclear weapons” would never go for that.

Several decades of “anesthesia” have brought their effects, only recently has the Russian Federation been once again perceived in its true form—a brutal empire, guided by its kind of rationality incompatible with liberal democracy. Many years of investment in the armed forces and information warfare tools have made Russia, once again over the centuries, a formidable enemy. However, this seems to be the last possible effort, as such a level of defense spending is unsustainable with the prospect of an energy paradigm shift that will completely change the world in a decade or two. And it will change Russia with its dependence on oil and gas exports. Of course, this country may change and adopt the values that today only a small part of Russian society cherishes—but this would mean the collapse of the kleptocracy that rules the Russian Federation today. It would not be a painless process—which is what all Russia’s neighbors are afraid of. It seems, however, that the Russian oligarchy needs to be separated from society because:

are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor.

It seems that at this difficult historical moment, when “times have become interesting again,” the most important thing for Poland and the countries of our region is to survive the Russian imperial frenzy by building military deterrence and tightening economic and political ties with the West. Due to its economic and military potential, the United States is and will be the leader of the free world—our key ally.

The New Generation of War, whose genesis and main assumptions are presented in this study, is extremely dangerous for the Euro-Atlantic world because it preys on the weaknesses of a democratic society multiplied by the information revolution of the Internet. It seems, however, that a democracy that has already undergone several historical trials can and should stand up to fight for its values. However, to be effective, one first needs to understand the opponent’s strategy and then defeat it with one’s own. That is why Phillip A. Petersen’s book, clearly showing the mechanisms that Putin and the Russian Federation use to fight the West, is so important. Being aware of the threat and its shape may enable politicians, societies, and nations to make the right decisions and defend themselves against Russian aggression on our values, freedom, and the future of our children.

_Łukasz Przybyło, Ph.D._PREFAȚĂ
- SILVIU NATE

Pentru statele aflate pe frontiera estică a NATO, agresiunea Rusiei sub diverse forme reprezintă o realitate cotidiană. Sunt destul de rare ocaziile când analiști occidentali surprind esența provocărilor strategice din Marea Baltică și Marea Neagră. Phillip Petersen este exponentul acestui culoar distinct de expertiză care ne oferă o înțelegere comprehensivă nu doar asupra fenomenului în sine, ci datorită evaluării analitice de tip net assessment oferă celorlalți contribuitori oportunitatea de a furniza opțiuni de securizare.

În loc să se alăture curentului principal al evoluției socio-economice și politice europene după prăbușirea Uniunii Sovietice din 1991, Moscova a ales să se întoarcă la paradigma imperială rusă pre-sovietică. Drept urmare, Moscova a continuat să se situeze în opoziție cu implicarea americană în Europa și s-a opus promovării valorilor democratice liberale de către Uniunea Europeană.

Doctrinele ofensive bazate pe ideologia și valorile feudale al Kremlinului ne-au aruncat într-un război cognitiv cu efecte implacabile în plan socio-cultural asupra politicii, care au condus prin exploatarea ecosistemelor informaționale și operații de influență la polarizare socială și accentuarea extremelor politice în lumea occidentală. Instrumentele cognitive și non-cinetice utilizate de Rusia au împins vecinătatea comună către veritabile zone gri – împânzită de state cărora Moscova le-a generat conflicte sub false pretexte, dar atentează în același timp la stabilitatea și valorile fundamentale ale membrilor Alianței.

Deși preocupările pentru analiza mediului de securitate al Mării Negre au fost periferice sau marginale pentru multă vreme în spațiul de reflecție occidental, complexitatea tendințelor de distribuire a puterii la Marea Neagră indică rolul critic și indispensabil al acestui nod geopolitic de securitate transatlantică. Consolidarea ofensivă strategică rusă pune accent pe mutarea centrului de greutate de la nord la sud, iar realitățile geostrategice actuale sunt percepute acum de către Statul Major al Federației Ruse ca integrând Marea Neagră sub controlul Rusiei. Anexarea ilegală al Crimeii de către Rusia și utilizarea unui avanpost militar naval în Sevastopol întreține și aprovizionează conflictele din Siria și Libia, cu implicații de problematizare a securității Flancului Sudic European în Marea Mediterană, alimentând dorința mai largă a Rusiei de a accesa facil Oceanul Atlantic.

Phillip Petersen aduce o perspectivă de substanță și produce relații determinante între modelul de analiză a fenomenului operațional rusesc și Războiul de Nouă Generație al Rusiei ce reflectă influența și interpretarea Kremlinului asupra strategiei militare occidentale. Preocupările analiștilor dedicați înțelegerii organizării militare ruse, dar și preocupările noastre la Centrul de Studii Globale pentru integrarea expertizei internaționale și formularea de recomandări politice care au contribuit la creșterea prezenței aliate în Marea Neagră, se intersectează avantajos cu vocația lui Phillip Petersen pentru evaluări operaționale și experiența sa bogată în jocuri de război (wargaming). Acest demers analitic plasează autorul pe un palier distinct al expertizei americane, fiind unul dintre puținii specialiști care pătrund în esența Frontului Estic al Alianței și operaționalizează agil rolul critic pe care îl joacă Marea Baltică și Marea Neagră pentru securitatea transatlantică. Viziunea imperialistă a lui Vladimir Putin, pe fondul recuperării teritoriilor „pierdute” în urma destrămării Uniunii Sovietice, plasează Marea Neagră și Marea Baltică în centrul preocupărilor cu potențial de confruntare. Orientarea spre practicitate a cărții contextualizează evaluări strategice, lecții învățate, scenarii și opțiuni de consolidare a regiunii Marea Baltică – Marea Neagră, evidențiind rolul statelor din prima linie, respectiv România și Polonia ca centre de gravitație pentru stabilitatea Europei de Est, ce se confruntă direct cu realitatea geostrategică a frontului estic al NATO.

Sprijinul SUA în cadrul Inițiativei celor Trei Mări poate contribui semnificativ la creșterea și consolidarea infrastructurii necesare pentru îmbunătățirea mobilității militare, a desfășurărilor de urgență și a prezenței operaționale. În același timp, are rolul de a spori interdependențele economice și poate oferi randament investițiilor americane în regiune. Un angajament ferm al SUA nu va asigura doar un ascendent defensiv al statelor din prima linie a NATO, dar va crește și profilul socio-economic coercitiv al acestora în raport cu Rusia.

Marele rezultat al acestei lucrări constă în fuziunea dintre personalitatea intelectuală și experiența directă a principalului „modelator” al acestui volum colectiv, în calitatea sa de fost analist de informații al Defense Intelligence Agency, cu idei colectate de-a lungul timpului din cercetări, analize și cercuri de reflecție consacrate. Cartea oferă recomandări utile pentru viitorul Concept Strategic al Alianței și reprezintă un suport valoros pentru construcția politicilor de securitate, apărare și diplomație publică. Capacitatea de a granula percepțiile Est-Vest pun în centrul hărții Marea Neagră – un nod geopolitic situat între: perspectivele aliate, speranțele statelor aspirante și agenda Rusiei.

Sunt convins că, după parcurgerea acestei lucrări, introducerea unui model multidisciplinar care examinează un set mult mai larg de variabile analitice și perspective decât în mod obișnuit – o abordare care reflectă în mod clar un nou tip de război – cititorul va înțelege mult mai bine amploarea confruntării în NATO și Uniunea Europeană se regăsesc angajate. Europa de Est nu este doar un flanc, este frontul unui război desfășurat la scară largă cu implicații globale care se poartă deja în profunzimea noastră colectivă, nu doar în capitalele și societățile noastre, ci în mintea fiecărui cetățean în căutarea libertății și justiției socio-economice.

_Dr. Silviu Nate_

_Director al Centrului de Studii Globale_

_Universitatea „Lucian Blaga” din Sibiu, România_FOREWORD
- SILVIU NATE

For NATO’s eastern border states, Russia’s aggression in various forms is a daily reality. It is quite rare for Western analysts to capture the essence of the strategic challenges in the Baltic and the Black Sea. Phillip Petersen is the exponent of a distinct area of expertise that gives us a comprehensive understanding not only of the phenomenon itself but also, because of his net assessment analytical approach, offers his other contributors the opportunity of providing security options.

Instead of joining the mainstream of European socio-economic and political evolution after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow chose to return to the pre-Soviet Russian imperial paradigm. As a result, Moscow found itself still in opposition to American involvement in Europe and opposed to the European Union’s promotion of liberal democratic values.

The offensive doctrines based on the Kremlin’s ideological and feudalist values have plunged us into a cognitive war with relentless socio-cultural impact upon politics that, through the exploitation of information ecosystems and influence operations led to social polarization and stressing of political extremes throughout the Western world. The cognitive and non-kinetic instruments used by Russia have pushed the common neighborhood to veritable gray areas—littered with states within which Moscow has generated conflicts under false pretenses, simultaneously undermining the stability and the fundamental values of Alliance members.

Although concerns for the analysis of the Black Sea security environment have been peripheral or marginal for a long time in the Western space of reflection, the complexity of power distribution trends in the Black Sea suggests both a critical and indispensable role for this geopolitical node of transatlantic security. Russia’s strategic offensive consolidation focuses on shifting the center of gravity from north to south, while current geostrategic realities are now perceived by the Russian Federation’s General Staff as integrating the Black Sea under Russian control. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the use of a naval outpost in Sevastopol to maintain and supply the conflicts in Syria and Libya, having implications on the security of the European Southern Flank in the Mediterranean and fueling Russia’s wider desire for easy access the Atlantic Ocean.

Phillip Petersen brings a substantial perspective and displays decisive relationships between the analytic model of the Russian operational phenomenon and Russian New Generation Warfare, which reflect the Kremlin’s influence and view of Western military strategy. The concerns of analysts dedicated to understanding the Russian military structure, but also our preoccupations at the Global Studies Center for integrating international expertise and formulating policy recommendations that have contributed to increasing the allied presence in the Black Sea, intersect with Phillip Petersen’s vocation for operational assessments and his rich experience in wargaming. This analytical approach places the author on a distinct level within American expertise, being one of the few specialists to penetrate the essence of the Alliance’s Eastern Front and to agilely operationalize the critical role that the Baltic and the Black Seas play for broader transatlantic security. Vladimir Putin’s imperialist vision, based on the recovery of “lost” territories following the collapse of the Soviet Union, places the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea at the center of concerns for potential confrontations. The book’s orientation towards practicality contextualizes strategic assessments, lessons learned, scenarios, and options for consolidating the Baltic–Black Sea region, highlighting the role of frontline states, namely Romania and Poland as gravity centers for the stability of Eastern Europe, as the two of them are directly faced with the geostrategic reality of NATO’s eastern front.

US support for the Three Seas Initiative can make a significant contribution to increasing and strengthening the infrastructure needed to improve military mobility, emergency deployment, and operational presence. At the same time, it has the potential to increase economic interdependence and can provide a return on US investment in the region. A strong US commitment will not only ensure a defensive ascendancy of NATO frontline states, but it will also increase their coercive socio-economic profile vis-à-vis Russia.

The great outcome of this work is the fusion between the intellectual personality and the direct experience of the principal “shaper” of this collective volume, in his capacity as a former intelligence analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency, with ideas collected over time from established research, analyses, and reflection groups. The book provides useful recommendations for the Alliance’s future Strategic Concept and is a valuable support for the construction of security, defense, and public diplomacy policies. The ability to granulate East-West perceptions puts the Black Sea at the center of the map—a geopolitical node between Allied perspectives, aspiring states’ hopes, and Russia’s agenda.

I trust that after reading this work introducing a multi-discipline model examining a far wider than normal set of analytical variables and perspectives—an approach that clearly reflects a new type of warfare—that the reader will much better understand the magnitude of the confrontation in which NATO and the European Union find themselves engaged. Eastern Europe is not just a flank, it is the front of a large-scale war with global implications already being waged in our collective depth—not just in our capitals and societies—but in the minds of each of our citizens seeking liberty and socio-economic justice.

_Dr. Silviu Nate_

_Director of the Global Studies Center_

_Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Romania_ABOUT AUTHOR

PHILLIP A. PETERSEN has a Ph.D. from University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana. For fifteen years he served as a United States Army officer, an intelligence analyst at the Library of Congress and for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and as a policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and at the National Defense University. Upon leaving government service with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dr. Petersen served for 25 years as a Senior Fellow at The Potomac Foundation, and served as its Vice President for Studies until he left to form the Centre for the Study of New Generation Warfare.